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COMMENTS
ACTS OF TERRORISM AND COMBAT BY
IRREGULAR FORCES-AN INSURANCE
"WAR RISK"?
The development of modem warfare techniques, accentu-
ated by vast technological advancements, has been accompanied
by the emergence of world-wide terrorism.' Recent incidents of
violent destruction by well organized, politically motivated terror-
ist military groups have shocked the world. 2  Protracted guerrilla
warfare conducted by irregular forces, professed as essential by
twentieth century revolutionaries,3 has proved an effective form
of modem warfare.' Such warfare incorporates terrorism as a
major tactic.5 Many problems are posed by these acts of interna-
tional terrorism, not the least of which is the plight of the inno-
cent victim. Where the injured is insured under normal personal
or property casualty insurance policies which exclude loss result-
ing from certain specified "war risks", an issue is presented as
to whether the terrorist activity is among the "war risks" so ex-
cluded. If so, a court may deny the insured indemnification un-
der the policy.
The purpose of this Comment is to explore the "war risk"
clause commonly included in insurance policies and to evaluate
its applicability when destruction is the result of terrorist activities
of guerrilla forces and armed bands.'
1. U.S. DEP'T STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, CURRENT FOREIGN
POLICY, The Role of International Law in Combating Terrorism, Pub. No. 8689,
General Foreign Policy Ser. 270 (Jan. 1973) [hereinafter cited as U.S. DEP'T
STATE, Pub. No. 8689].
2. Id.
3. MAO TSE-TUNG, ON GUERRILLA WARFARE 20-22 and 41-45 (S. Griffith
transl. 1961) [hereinafter cited as MAO TSE-TUNG].
4. Hearings Bejore the Committee on Foreign Relations 5, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 62 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968 Hearings].
5. MAO TSE-TUNG, supra note 3, at 20-22 and 41-45.
6. The scope of this Comment is limited to losses caused by terrorist ac-
tivities of guerrilla forces and armed bands actively involved in the overthrow
or destruction of a sovereign government. Discussion of possible application of
"riot" exclusionary insurance clauses to terrorism by groups lacking such ambi-
tious ultimate purposes, complex military organization, or capacity to add signifi-
cantly to the destruction or overthrow of a soveriegn is beyond the intended
scope of this article.
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I. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC. V.
AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY CO.'
In the recent Pan American World Airways case, a federal
court was confronted with the issue of whether the loss of a Boe-
ing 747 jumbo jet, which was hijacked and destroyed by Arab
terrorists, was the result of certain "war risks" excluded by the
aircraft standard marine aviation hull policy. The airliner, en-
route from Amsterdam to New York via London, was hijacked
by two armed terrorists working for the most radically militant
faction of the fedayeen terrorist groups: the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).8 The hijacking was part
of a larger plan to capture four Israeli (El Al) airliners. Partial
frustration of the plan resulted in the alternative hijacking of the
Pan Am aircraft.9 The terrorists demanded that the jumbo jet
be flown to Beirut, Lebanon, where the aircraft was boarded by
other members of the PFLP. The passengers were held on the
aircraft as hostages. The hijackers then ordered the aircraft
flown to Cairo, Egypt, where, prior to landing, fuses were lit to
explosives planted in the aircraft. At Cairo the passengers were
given only minutes to disembark after landing; several were in-
jured in the ensuing panic. The aircraft was totally destroyed by
explosions and fire.' °
The aircraft hull was insured by a syndicated aviation under-
writing group, of which Aetna was a member, for all normal avia-
tion risks under a policy containing the standard marine policy
"war risk" exclusions." It was further covered by policies from
other insurers, including the United States Government, which
insured the aircraft against losses resulting from "war risks".' 2
7. Civil No. 71-1118 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-
2604, 2d Cir., Oct. 8, 1973.
8. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., Civil
No. 71-1118, at 2, 3, 19-33 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1973), appeal docketed, No.
73-2604, 2d Cir., Oct. 8, 1973.
9. Id., at 33-34.
10. Id., at 38-47.
11. The policy recited that among the causes of loss excluded were: "War,
invasion, civil war, revolution, rebellion, insurrection or warlike operations,
whether there be a declaration of war or not; .... i" Id., at 9.
12. Policies of both the "war risk" insurers and the government recited
among the enumerated risks covered:
War, invasion, acts of foreign enemies, hostilities (whether war be de-
clared or not), civil war, rebellion, revolution or insurrection, military
or usurped power or confiscation and/or nationalization or requisition
or destruction by any government or public or local authority or by
Vol. 4
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In holding the former liable for the loss, the court declared that
the hijacking and destruction by the PFLP was not a result of
"war, civil war, revolution, rebellion, insurrection, or warlike op-
eration". This was found true even conceding that the PFLP may
have been working methodically toward the overthrow of a sov-
ereign and may have engaged in other activities that could be
properly called "warlike operations".' 3  The court recognized
that while this hijacking of a private, commercial United States
aircraft was for propaganda purposes, it was not warlike because
the attack was not directed against a sovereign with which the
terrorists were at war. 4  The court, in finding that the loss was
too remote to be considered the result of a "warlike operation"
or "civil insurrection", indicated doubt that the contracting parties
had imagined "war risks" to encompass terrorist hijacking or de-
struction occurring thousands of miles from a given sporadic con-
flict.15 Rather, the airline hijacking and the potential danger of
monumental loss in lives and property posed by each such occur-
rence was deemed to be an ordinary aviation risk of which the in-
surer was aware. Further, the court indicated that if such risk was
not to be assumed in the normal hull policy, it should have been so
specified in the contract. The fact that the insurer chose not to der-
ogate from the terms derived from the ancient common marine in-
surance hull policy and that he failed to specifically include hijack-
ing among the war risk exclusions, was also considered by the
court as it applied the usual rule of public policy to interpret
insurance contracts most favorably to the insured.
16
The court in the Pan Am case did not foreclose the pos-
sibility that "war risks" might include some commercial air-
craft hijackings by irregular forces.' 7 However, it did find that
a terrorist hijacking was not the result of "war risks" where there
was: (1) no actual condition of war in which the terrorist organ-
ization was involved;' 8 (2) no foreseeable danger of loss arising
from the proximity of the war;' 9 and, (3) no intent of the perpetra-
tors that the hijacking contribute to conquest or coercion of a
any independent unit or individual engaged in irregular warfare.
Id., at 11.
13. Id., at 94-95.
14. Id., at 88-89.
15. Id., at 71 & 94.
16. id., at 53-69.
17. Id., at 81.
18. Id.
19. ld., at 94.
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sovereign government against which the terrorist group was actively
engaged in war.
20
II. WAR RISK CLAUSES
For a proper understanding of the implications of the Pan
Am case, it is essential to consider the historical development
of "war risk" clauses. This development contributes signifi-
cantly to an analysis of the intent of parties to insurance contracts
involving the conditions and activities described in "war risk"
clauses.
War exclusionary clauses such as those found in the Pan
Am case appear with a minimum of variations in almost all
forms of personal and commercial accident, casualty, liability,
and fire insurance policies. Life insurance policies universally
exclude such risks from coverage, both for double indemnity acci-
dental death benefits and for accidental injury disability waiver-
of-premiums benefits. 2 Commercial, property, cargo, and ma-
rine policies which insure against all forms of accidental fire and
casualty, exclude liability when losses occur as the result of "war
risks".22
These clauses have been adopted generally from marine in-
surance policies in which the need for such insurance first arose.
These policies contained the standard "free of capture and seiz-
ure" clause which included descriptions of "war risk" exclusions.23
20. Id.
21. The greatest variety of insurance war risk exclusionary clauses seems
to appear in life insurance policies. Some depend upon death while in the mili-
tary service during war ("status" clauses). Other exclusions merely provide for
death resulting from war ("results" causes). For examples of life insurance
clauses, see Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 996 (1954) and Billing, Of War Clauses,
[1952] INs. L.J. 793, 798 [hereinafter cited as Billing]. For comparison of
"status" and "result" clauses, see Note, The War Clause in Life Insurance Con-
tracts, 4 UTAH L. REV. 120 (1954).
22. See Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., Civil
No. 71-1118 at 9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-2604, 2d
Cir., Oct. 8, 1973 (aviation property); International Dairy Engineering Co. v.
American Home Assur. Co., 352 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 474 F.2d
1242 (9th Cir. 1973) (property-cargo); Flota Mercante Dominicana v. American
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 272 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (marine); Hamdi &
Ibrahim Mango Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 291 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1961) (cargo-
property); E. IVAMY, MARINE INSURANCE 217 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
IVAMY]. Examples compiled from student survey of insurance companies, con-
ducted Oct. 1973 (on file with CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.).
23. For discussion of emergence of "war risks" clauses from "free of cap-
ture and seizure" clauses, see IVAMY, supra note 22, at 217. For a sample Stand-
Vol. 4
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After the creation of "war risk" exclusionary clauses for normal
marine casualty insurance, a separate group of "war risk" under-
writers emerged in London. The problem of allocating losses
between normal casualty insurers and "war risk" insurers, as pre-
sented in the Pan Am case, naturally developed.24
The vast body of English maritime law, wherein the appli-
cability of "war risk" exclusions has been extensively litigated,
has historically provided American courts with substantial prece-
dent for interpreting "war risk" clauses.25 However, one impor-
tant divergence between modem American and British decisions
has arisen in the definition of proximate causation. The British
common law view was that a loss could be the result of war even
though caused from a risk normal to the insured activity aggra-
vated by a war in which the insured was directly or indirectly
involved.26 The modem American position is that for a loss to
be the result of a "war risk", the loss must be attributable to
risks peculiar to the use of military operations and the proximate
result of conflict between armed forces.27 The loss cannot be
the result of a risk common to the activity involved which is
ard Form of English Marine Policy, and Cargo All Risk Clause, see id., at 534-
35.
24. See Note, Allocation of Risk Between Marine and War Insurer, 51
YALE L.J. 674 (1942). Consideration of British litigation allocating loss be-
tween "war risk" and marine risk insurers is useful to the study of interpretation
of war risk clauses. In such cases courts have been compelled to carefully scru-
tinize fact situations to determine whether resulting losses were caused by normal
risks or war risks. United States v. Standard Oil, 178 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1949),
af 'd, 349 U.S. 54 (1950); Queens Ins. Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co.,
282 F. 976 (2d Cir. 1922), aff'd, 263 U.S. 487 (1924); Brittain S.S. Co. v.
The King, [1921] 1 A.C. 99 (1920); Clan Line Steamers, Ltd. v. Liverpool and
London War Risks Ins. Ass'n Ltd., [1943] 1 K.B. 209 (1942); Liverpool &
London War Risk Ins. Ass'n v. Marine Underwriters of "Richard de Larrinaga,"
[1921] 7 Lloyd's List L.R. 151 (H.L. 1921).
25. Although the Supreme Court overturned its previous requirement that
American courts were bound to apply British law while interpreting and apply-
ing "war risk" exclusionary clauses in marine policies in Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 340 U.S. 54 (1950), British law still appears to provide United
States courts with substantial interpretive assistance in situations where insuffi-
cient analogous American authority is found. See Note, 26 N.Y.U.L. REV. 362
(1951); see also International Dairy Engineering Co. of Asia v. American Home
Assur. Co., 352 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. Cal. 1970), a! 'd, 474 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir.
1973); Flota Mercante Dominicana v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 272 F.
Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., Civil No. 71-1118, at 94 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1973), appeal docketed,
No. 73-2604, 2d Cir., Oct. 8, 1973.
26. See cases cited note 24 supra.
27. Id. See also cases cited note 25 supra.
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merely aggravated by a condition of war.28
A major problem in arriving at a judicial determination of
whether a certain loss was the direct result of "war risks" is to
determine what the concept of "war" encompasses.29 Certainly
some state of general military conflict is contemplated." ° During
World War II and the Korean conflict, numerous life insurance
cases in the United States involved litigation of the issue of
whether a state of war is to be defined by constitutional or inter-
national technical formalities, or by actual physical military con.
flict by government and irregular forces. 31  While most policies
now in effect recite that exclusions apply to both declared and
undeclared war,32 the cases arising out of World War II and the
Korean conflict are worthy of note. These cases help to estab-
lish an understanding of the intent of the contracting parties as
to the meaning of war; the tendency of courts to construe ambig-
uous "war risk" clauses in terms most favorable to the insured;
and, the judicial willingness to give a common sense meaning
to policy wording where it appears certain that the contracting
parties intended such interpretation."8
In the case of life insurance contracts, decisions varied as
to whether deaths at Pearl Harbor 34 hours before declaration of
war, deaths after hostilities ceased in World War II and before
formal peace treaties were signed,8 5 or deaths during the Korean
war were the result of "war".36 Those decisions which adopted
28. Id.
29. To avoid confusion of terms surrounding the concept of war and the
existence of war, the following definitions will be employed herein: (1) "state
of war" will be used to mean the existence of an armed conflict formally and
constitutionally declared by sovereign governments; (2) "condition of war" shall
be used to refer to a broad concept of war in fact, including armed conflict
between nations or parts thereof, fighting without formal declaration of war.
30. Rogers, Modern Warfare and Its Effect on Policy Construction,
[1952] INS. L.J. 360, 361 [hereinafter cited as Rogers].
31. See Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 996 (1954).
32. FollRman, Commercial Accident Insurance, [1952] INs. L.J. 737, at 744.
33. See Rogers, supra note 30, at 361.
34. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260 (10th Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 881 (1947) noted in 56 YALE L.J. 746 (1947).
See also Rosenau v. Idaho Mut. Ben. Assn., 65 Idaho 408, 145 P.2d 227 (1944);
Savage v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 57 F. Supp. 620 (D.C. La. 1944);
West v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 202 S.C. 422, 25 S.E.2d 475 (1943).
35. Stinson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1948);
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Durham, 166 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1948).
36. Beley v. Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 231, 95 A.2d 202
(1953); Stanberry v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 26 N.J. Super. 498, 98 A.2d 134
Vol. 4
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a broad view of war held that such exclusions applied because
the term "war" should be considered in the factual context
viewed through the exercise of executive authority competent to
commit military forces to combat.8 7  Military conflict was of
prime importance. Courts which adopted a restrictive view of
the term "war" approached the definition as a political question,
holding that judicial cognizance of war may be taken only upon
formal declaration by the proper political authority.18
The modem trend evidences a common sense approach to-
wards the broader interpretation. Today there is substantial au-
thority favoring a determination that a state of war is a question
of fact for executive determination, as necessary for protection
of its soverign national interest.39  Once such a determination
has been made by official statement or by government-directed
overt military action, the trend has been to declare that a condi-
tion of war exists for insurance purposes.40  The American courts
(1953); Western Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 152 Tex. 559, 261 S.W.2d
554, cert. denied, 347 U.S. 928 (1953).
37. Western Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 152 Tex. 559, 261 S.W.2d
554, cert. denied, 347 U.S. 928 (1953); Hooker v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
161 F.2d 852 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 809 (1947); New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 811
(1947); Vanderbilt v. Travelers Ins. Co., 112 Misc. 248, 259, 184 N.Y.S. 54,
55 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1920), aII'd without opinion, 202 A.D. 738, 194
N.Y.S. 986 (1st Dep't 1922), af'd per curiam, 235 N.Y. 514, 139 N.E. 715
(1923).
38. Savage v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 57 F. Supp. 620 (D.C. La.
1944). Pang v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 37 Hawaii 208 (1945); West v. Palmetto
State Life Ins. Co., 202 S.C. 422, 25 S.E.2d 475 (1943).
39. The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635
(1862).
40. Langlas v. Iowa Life Ins. Co., 245 Iowa 982, 63 N.W.2d 885 (1954);
Western Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 152 Tex. 559, 261 S.W.2d 554, cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 928 (1953); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d
260 (10th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 881 (1947); New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Durham, 166 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1948); Rosenalle v. Idaho Mut. Ben.
Assn., 65 Idaho 408, 145 P.2d 227 (1944); cf. Beley v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 231, 95 A.2d 202 (1953). Justice Musmanno stated that:
mo deny that the Korean military action is not war in its popularly
accepted meaning is to deny the evidence of one's senses. Courts nor-
mally take judicial notice of whatever is unquestioningly accepted by
informed society as fact. . . . Courts know that in Korea, armies are
pitted against each other utilizing every device known to modern war-
fare in the effort and determination to exterminate each other. We
know this to be true because every medium of communication extant
informs us that it is true. There is not one voice, one printed word,
or one picture in the newspapers, radio broadcasts and television images
which present themselves before our eyes or appeal to our ears that
bespeaks anything to the contrary. In addition, judges have physically
seen soldiers who have returned from Korea and have witnessed the
7
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are now more prone to determine that in the practical sense of
the word, war envisages the conduct of warring forces irrespective
of the formal technicalities of international law.
This broad interpretation of war adopted in the life insur-
ance cases seems in harmony with what Korean era spokesmen
of the insurance industry argued was intended by the parties.4
Since life insurance policies would seem to be basically contracts
of adhesion, it seems probable that "war risk" exclusionary
clauses are the subject of minimal consideration or objection by
the average insured during the period of solicitation of his policy.
Therefore, his intent as to the meaning of such clauses is prac-
tically impossible to ascertain. In commercial casualty, marine,
and aviation insurance contracting, much more extensive negotia-
tion of terms is probable. However, due to a lack of published
materials by such insured businesses, their intentions regarding
the precise meaning of the "war risk" clause seems unsure be-
yond the obvious intent that they receive maximum insurance
coverage for minimum premiums. Since writings of the insur-
ance industry regarding its intent are the only published sources
available, they should prove enlightening in determining the in-
tent of the parties, providing the inherent bias in such material
is recognized.
Taking judicial cognizance of the fact that insurers are re-
sponsible for language used in insurance contracts, American
courts tend to interpret ambiguities in such contracts against the
drafters of the policies in terms most favorable to the insured. 42
As in other contracts, maxims of construction usually dictate that
the words of insurance contracts should be construed in accord-
ance with the ordinary meaning of the language used and not
given a strained, unnatural, or technical construction. 43  Hence,
evidence of their contact with forces which have inflicted wounds pe-
culiarly the result of gunfire and cannon fire, the trademark of war.
373 Pa. 231, 240-41; 95 A.2d 202, 213 (concurring opinion).
41. See Rogers, supra note 30, at 361.
42. Flota Mercante Domicana v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 272 F.
Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Continental Cas. Co. v. Beelar, 405 F.2d 377 (D.C.
Cir. 1968); Sincoff v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 11 N.Y.2d 386, 183 N.E.2d
899, 230 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1962); Silverstein v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 237 N.Y.
391, 143 N.E. 231 (1924); Mahon v. American Cas. Co., 65 N.J. Super. 148,
157-58, 167 A.2d 191, 196 (1961):
Ambiguities in insurance policies should be resolved, where reasonable
to do so, strictly against the insurer . . . [in order to] . . . arrive at a
construction fairly according with the intent of the insurer in writing
it and the reasonable expectations of the assured in buying it.
43. Judicial construction is typified by the statement that:
Vol. 4
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in drafting war clauses using common English, it is the task of
the insurance industry to select effective verbiage.
After the litigation arising out of the Korean conflict, the
solution envisioned by the insurers was to refrain from reliance
upon the courts' inconsistent interpretations of "war". 44  There-
fore, contract language was drafted enumerating all the risks
which insurers had previously considered implied in the word
"war", 45 including "declared" and "undeclared war", "civil war",
"insurrection", and "warlike operations". Though insurers thought
these risks had been included within the term "war", the vast
majority of the life insurance claims arising from the Korean
conflict were paid by insurers without dispute. 46  The industry
was generally content to resort to redrafting future contracts
specifically incorporating these terms.
4 T
Characteristically, each of the specifically recited "war risks"
is unique to a general armed conflict between multiple national
forces or between irregular forces and at least one national
force. 48 Without a condition of war, no "war risk" should be
It is the settled law in this state that contracts of insurance in their
construction are governed by the same rules as other contracts, and that
terms used in them are to be given their plain, ordinary and generally
accepted meaning unless the instrument itself shows them to have been
used in a technical or different sense.
Western Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 152 Tex. 559, 564, 261 S.W.2d 554,
557 (1953).
44. Rogers, supra note 30, at 360-61.
45. Id. See also Wheeler, The War Clauses, [1953] INS. L.J., at 727-28
[hereinafter cited as Wheeler]:
The word "war" is ordinarily used in the policies in a generic sense
and would encompass war of every type. Where the all inclusive word
"war" is used, the contract is not rendered ambiguous by reason of fail-
ure to spell out the various types of war, such as civil war, world war,
foreign war, limited war, general war, public war, legal war, constitu-
tional war, declared war and undeclared war. Writers on the subject
of international law have classified types of war other than those listed,
but the fact remains that each of these types of war is a war in fact
and the use of the adjectives would limit rather than enlarge the mean-
ing of the word "war" as used in the contract.
46. Rogers, supra note 30, at 360.
47. Id.
48. Wheeler states that:
A condition or state of war will exist at any time when any warlike
or aggressive act is recognized to be an act of war. [While the lan-
guage in some of the cases would appear to indicate otherwise, it would
seem reasonable to assume and hold that an act of war may be com-
mitted only in time of war. An agressive act, which may also be called
a warlike act, may or may not be considered to be an act of war by
the party attacked, but any recognition that such an aggressive act is
an act of war would seem to require a holding that war exists and
that it is in time of war.
Wheeler, supra note 45, at 732-33.
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applied as the cause of a loss.4" Where there is a condition of
war, it can include any or all of the particular activities regarded
as "war risks". The insurer intends that all loss resulting from
war and the specific types of conflict described should be ex-
cluded from coverage under an insurance policy.50
III. DETERMINATION OF A CONDITION OF WAR
Assuming the necessity of the existence of some condition
of war before any "war risk" can be applicable, and focusing
upon the judicial tendency to allow inferences of a state of war
from informal military actions by proper executive authority,"' an
issue of primary import involves what governmental actions are
necessary to give rise to such inferences. Little problem is posed
where large military forces of two or more belligerent sovereign
nations are pitted against each other across international bound-
aries 2 or where different entities in a single nation, each mili-
tarily capable of exerting sovereign authority over some substan-
tial area, are militarily engaged against each other.58 At -the
other extreme, the determination is more difficult where govern-
ments are required to react against a small irregular force at
home or abroad with only limited military force in defense of
another government or society. 54 There is a fine distinction be-
tween large-scale criminal activity requiring use of only ordinary
internal police equipment and procedures, and small-scale mili-
tary aggression by significant, well organized irregular forces,
which would be sufficient to provoke such sovereigns to resort
to military force to maintain political stability and public order.
How should courts draw this line? How should courts de-
fine such abstract terms as aggression? Due to political biases
and patent confusion involved in defining a term such as aggres-
sion, internationally adopted definitions and statements of politi-
cal theorists seem to lack sufficient definiteness to be of more
49. Id. See also Rogers, supra note 30, at 360-61.
50. Id.
51. Montoya v. U.S., 180 U.S. 261 (1901); The Brig Amy Warwick (The
Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862); Flota Mercante Dominicana v.
American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 272 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
52. Western Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 152 Tex. 559, 261 S.W.2d
554, cert. denied, 347 U.S. 928 (1953).
53. The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635
(1862).
54. See Flota Mercante Dominicana v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 272
F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Vol. 4
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than negligible judicial value. 58 The problem of evaluating the
potency of an irregular force, its interrelation with its other allied
forces, and the overall significance of the irregular force to the
ultimate goals of its allies' movement, increases the difficulty of
establishing a judicial standard for the existence of a condition
of war. Modern revolutionaries indicate that there is a shifting
complexity of structures of regular and irregular forces in prose-
cution of protracted "wars of liberation", 56 as shown by the revo-
lution in China5 7 and the continuing conflict in the Republic of
Vietnam.58 The analysis of the complex political, military, eco-
nomic and sociological factors interwoven into each limited
conflict or revolution,59 which would be necessary for a court to
evaluate in order to determine whether any given guerrilla con-
flict constitutes a state of war, would seem overburdensome. At-
tempts to arrive at a standard would seem -fruitless unless an ob-
jective determination of the existence or nonexistence of a condi-
tion of war could be made. Such a determination could be more
easily accomplished by taking judicial notice of guidance, ex-
pressed or implied, from the proper political agency of the gov-
ernment that is responsible for analyzing and reacting to the par-
ticular situation. In other words, retrospective analysis of re-
sponse by the war making agencies of a soverign government
would probably be a more satisfactory foundation for determina-
tion of standards for a condition of war.60
American judicial authority reveals a tendency to allow in-
ference of a condition of war for "war risk" purposes to be drawn
from observance of military reaction of a sovereign against irreg-
ular forces.6" Such guerrilla aggression has been held to include
attacks upon either the sovereign entity and its military forces,
or civilians and property entitled to protection by the sovereign.
6 2
55. Hazard, Why Try Again to Define Aggression?, 62 AM. J. INT'L L.
701 (1968).
56. MAO TSE-TUNG, supra note 3, at 20-22, 41-45, and 51-57.
57. Id.
58. 1968 Hearings, supra note 4.
59. MAO TSE-TUNG, supra note 3.
60. Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261 (1901).
61. In a case involving the issue of whether conflict between settlers and
Apache Indians constituted a state of war the court said:
[T]he fact the Indians are engaged in acts of general hostility to set-
tiers, especially if the government has deemed it necessary to dispatch
a military force for their subjugation, is sufficient to constitute a state
of war.
Id. at 267.
62. Id. See also The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2
1974
11
Galyean: Acts of Terrorism and Combat by Irregular Forces--An Insurance "W
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1974
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
It would seem that any standard defining "state of war" for insur-
ance purposes should require judicial recognition of the use of
any regular military forces committed by the sovereign in re-
sponse to quelling irregular force activity.
The weaponry employed by the sovereign is another factor
courts could easily consider as bearing on the issue of a condition
of war for insurance purposes.0 3 Such a condition would be most
easily inferred where the sovereign's military utilized such tech-
nologically advanced weapons as tanks, naval vessels, aircraft,
"mines, torpedoes, bombs or other engines of war ... ,,64 ca-
pable of inflicting "wounds peculiarly the result of gunfire and
cannonfire, the trademarks of war." 5
The existence of such military hostilities at the time of a
loss should be the key to determining whether a condition of
war exists. Though courts differ as to whether post truce cease-
fire violations are part of the condition of war, the better view
from an insurance standpoint would seem to be that such out-
breaks are part of war. This is especially apparent where formal
termination of hostilities has imposed a state of peace over sol-
diers still willing to fight. 66  In excluding all the unpredict-
able fortuitous risks arising from the common concept of modern
war, it appears that the parties to an insurance contract intend
such exclusions to apply to the engagement of one or more sov-
ereign's military forces utilizing destructive military hardware
against its enemies for the full period of actual hostilities.
Black) 635, 666 (1862); Flota Mercante Dominicana v. American Mfrs. Mut.
Ins. Co., 272 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Hamdi & Ibrahim Mango Co. v.
Reliance Ins. Co., 291 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1961); Hamilton v. McClaughry, 136
F. 445 (D. Kan. 1905); Pesquerias y Secaderos de Bascalao de Espana, S.A. v.
Beer, 79 Lloyd's List L.R. 417 (K.B. 1946), rev'd, 80 Lloyd's List L.R. 318
(C.A. 1947) 1 All E.R. 845 (H.L. 1949).
63. Flota Mercante Dominicana v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 272 F.
Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
64. IVAMY, supra note 25, at 534.
65. Beley v. Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 231, 240-41, 95
A.2d 202, 213 (1953) (Musmanno, J., concurring). See also Flota Mercante
Dominicana v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 272 F. Supp. 540, 543 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
66. Compare Stawski v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 7 Misc. 2d 424,
163 N.Y.S.2d 155 (Sup. Ct.), appeal dismissed on consent, 170 N.Y.S.2d 489
(Ist Dep. 1957), with Shneiderman v. Metropolitan Cas. Co., 14 App. Div. 2d
284, 220 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1st Dept. 1961).
Vol. 4
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IV. MODERN ENUMERATED WAR RISKS AND
IRREGULAR FORCES
Having established the factual existence of the commonly
conceived war within which losses have occurred, courts have en-
gaged in further examination of the insurance policy to determine
under which, if any, of the specifically excluded risks a given
loss occurred. 67 While all types of military forces participating
in a war may seem capable of acts included within the term "war
risks", courts seem to differentiate between participants for pur-
poses of determining under which of the enumerated "war risks"
the insurance parties possibly meant to exclude the act involved. 6
A. Acts of War, Warlike Operations, and Hostilities
For insurance policy purposes, the term "war" itself has
been interpreted in a technical sense meaning the forcible contest
of arms between two or more de jure or de facto governments. 69
Frequently, terms such as "belligerent" or "enemy" are used in
this connection to apply to entities engaged in the war. Each
term in itself also refers to sovereign governments.70 By defini-
tion, neither indigenous guerrilla forces such as the Viet Cong
nor armed terrorist bands such as fedayeen are technically ca-
pable of an "act of war". 7
The term "warlike operations" in insurance contracts has
been interpreted much more broadly than has the term "war".72
67. Cases cited in note 40 supra. See also Flota Mercante Dominicana
v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 272 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
68. Compare Flota Mercante Dominicana v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.,
272 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), with International Dairy Engineering Co.
v. American Home Assur. Co., 474 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1973), affg, 352 F.
Supp. 827 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
69. Dole v. Merchants' Mut. Marine Ins. Co., 51 Me. 465 (1863); Gitlow
v. Kiely, 44 F.2d 227, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1930), aff'd, 49 F.2d 1077 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 284 U.S. 648 (1931); Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., Civil No. 71-1118, at 93 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 24, 1973), appeal
docketed, No. 73-2604, 2d Cir., Oct. 8, 1973.
70. Welts v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 48 N.Y. 34 (1871).
71. International Dairy Engineering Co. v. American Home Assur. Co., 474
F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1973), ajrg 352 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (Viet
Cong); Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., Civil No.
71-1118, at 93 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-2604, 2d Cir.,
Oct. 8, 1973 (fedayeen).
72. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., Civil
No. 71-1118, at 93-95 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-2604,
2d Cir., Oct. 8, 1973.
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The earlier British and American decisions tended to distinguish
"warlike operations" as meaning any military operation in time of
war, from "hostilities" as referring to actual specific defensive or of-
fensive operations.73 The modern trend is to disregard such distinc-
tions" The combat reflected by these terms is not solely limited
to action by and against military forces of sovereign belligerents.
While little American case law interpreting "warlike operations"
is available for study, modem cases seem to indicate that it might
include international combat between any number of guerrilla or
irregular forces, belligerent governments, and nonbelligerent gov-
ernments, and their neutral civilian citizenry. A simple defensive
response by United States forces using two high explosive 106mm
recoilless rifle shots against a very limited automatic and small
arms rebel attack from a seized ship was held to be a "warlike
operation". 75 Hence, a limited military combat act between a
defending sovereign and a belligerent armed rebel band would
seem to be included in the definition where the conflict encom-
passed use of modem military weaponry.76  One American case
tends to support the position that "warlike operation" includes
a situation where -two irregular forces are opposing each other
with acts of terrorism and combat during a period when the sov-
ereign governments of each are formally disengaged.7
A more difficult problem is presented where the attack in-
volved is principally against private civilians and property of a
non-belligerent state. Where the attack is by a belligerent state
against the private citizen or his property interest, the single
American case on point held that the loss being litigated was
73. Queens Ins. Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 282 F. 976, 979
(2d Cir. 1922), affd, 263 U.S. 487 (1924).
74. See Hamdi & Ibrahim Mango Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 291 F.2d 437
(2d Cir. 1961); Flota Mercante Dominicana v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.,
272 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
75. Flota Mercante Dominicana v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 272 F.
Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Banque Sabbag S.A.L. v. Hope, [1972] 1 Lloyd's
List L.R. 253 (Q.B.), af'd, C.A., Feb. 20, 1973 (by implication).
76. Compare Home Ins. Co. v. Davila, 212 F.2d 731 (1st Cir. 1954) ("ci-
vil insurrection" case where damage sustained directly from irregular force ac-
tivity), with Flota Mercante Dominicana v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 272
F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ("warlike operations" case where damage sus-
tained directly from U.S. defensive fire, provoked by offensive guerrilla fire).
Note that from a causation standpoint, it is immaterial whether the loss was
the direct result of offensive or defensive operations on the part of the irregular
force, or offensive or defensive operations of the government force.
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the result of "warlike operations". 78 Such a result is questionable
when a guerrilla force or armed band attacks only specific private
interests of citizens of non-belligerent states. Several European
cases arising out of World War II conduct, indicate that activity
such as assassination and property destruction by resistance move-
ments in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and Yugoslavia
could be considered "acts of war or warlike operations".9
In those instances, a state or condition of war existed at all
times throughout. Activities by resistance movements against po-
litical enemies, traitors, and use of private domestic property by
conquering enemy armies were found to be forms of combat op-
eration incident to war. Analogous American litigation is un-
available for study, probably 'because the United States has not
been engaged in a war on its own land since the Civil War. For
78. Bergman v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 6 Misc. 2d 987, 161 N.Y.S.2d
390 (Mun. Ct. 1956), rev'd, 11 Misc. 2d 482, 172 N.Y.S.2d 662 (App. Term
137 Dep't, 1958). Recovery for the value of a ring was sought under a property
policy where the ring was lost as an El Al airliner bound from Vienna to Tel
Aviv due to pilot error, drifted near the Bulgarian frontier and was shot down
by Bulgarian military personnel using anti-aircraft fire. The appellate court held
the loss was within the clause excluding loss resulting from "warlike operations".
79. Interpreting "war risk" clauses in cases involving losses resulting from
terrorism by resistance movements in World War II, one European court has
stated that:
[War . . . is no longer exclusively a contest between two armies ar-
rayed in the field as it used to be in times past. Instead it includes
every activity of the warring States to an extent that one may well
speak of total war. War assumes . . . a special form if a State is occu-
pied by the enemy . . . and if the population of the territory which
has been seized but not yet conquered does not submit to the domina-
tion of the invader. In these circumstances organized resistance arises
• . . it is necessarily clandestine, given the disproportionate strength of
the forces opposing each other. It is an underground war consisting
of ambushes, assaults, sabotage, and acts of terrorism. In other words,
it is guerrilla warfare ....
Beccarini v. Societa La Sictura, [1950] Ann. Dig. 352, 353 (No. 111) (Ct. Cass.,
Italy). See also Van Hoeve de Feyter v. Fire Ins. Co. of 1859, Ltd., [1947] Ann.
Dig. 169 (No. 81) (Dist. Ct. Dordrecht, Neth.) (purposely burned grain shed to
avoid enemy use was "act of war"). Accord, Sabatier v. Cie d'Assurances Gen-
erales, [1947] 2 Gaz. Pal. 184 (Cour. Comm. Seine, France) summarized in
[1946] Ann. Dig. 228 (train derailed by French Resistance); Cie D'Assur. La
Nationale v. Vve. Cabenel, [1946] Ann. Dig. 228 (No.95) (Ct. App., Montpellier,
France) ("Collaborator" executed by French Resistance); Smulders & Piccinati v.
Societe Anonyme "La Royale Belge," [1943-1945] Ann. Dig. 303 (No. 102) (Civ.
Ct. Liege, Belgium) (Died in motorcade ambushed by "partisans"); Saporiti v.
S.A. Infortuni Milano, [1950] Ann. Dig. 353 (Ct. App., Milan, Italy) notes re-
versal of [1948] Ann. Dig. 433 (No. 130) (Ct. of First Instance, Milan, Italy),
(Resistance assassination); cf. Office Departemental des Pupilles de la Nationa a
Lille v. Vve Watremez, [1946] 2 Gaz. Pal. 101 (Cass. Civ. France) noted in
[1946] Ann. Dig. 229.
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that reason, the European viewpoint that terrorism by armed re-
sistance bands and guerrilla forces during war are "acts of war"
or "warlike operations", is worthy of note.
The World War II European cases are obviously distinguish-
able from the Pan Am decision because neither the United
States, nor any private individual, nor the Pan Am 747 was at
war in any generic sense of the word with the fedayeen or any
of the states involved in Mid-East tensions.80 Neither Pan Am
nor its passengers were responsible for any act or omission which
the average traveler would foresee resulting in his involvement
and possible injury in the Mid-East conflict. This is especially
true where, as here, the airliner already over 2,000 miles from
the Mid-East, was enroute to a destination even more distant
s.8
The PFLP could have miscalculated the timing of their ex-
plosives or caused some other freak accident prior to landing re-
sulting in the aircraft exploding. In all probability, over 100 peo-
ple would have been killed, maimed, or injured. Many of the
hypothetical victims undoubtedly would have been covered by in-
surance policies in which they had purchased coverage for double
indemnity in the case of accidental death or waiver-of-premiums
in the event of disability caused by accidental injury. Both of
these benefits are universally excluded where the accident was
the result of "war risks".8 2 It does not seem reasonable that ei-
ther the insurer or the insured would have contemplated, within
the meaning of the standard "war risk" exclusions, death at the
hands of an armed band from a different part of the world not
engaged in any sort of combat with the nation of which the in-
sured and insurer are nationals. In the words of United States
District Court Judge Frankel in the Pan Am decision:
[T]here is no warrant in the general understanding of Eng-
lish, in history, or in precedent for reading the phrase "war-
like operations" to encompass the infliction of intentional vi-
olence by political groups (neither employed by nor repre-
senting governments) upon civilian citizens of non-beligerent
powers and their property at places far removed from the
locale or the subject of any warfare. This conclusion is
merely reinforced when the evident and avowed purpose of
80. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., Civil
No. 71-1118, at 94 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-2604,
2d Cir., Oct. 8, 1973.
81. Id.
82. Billing, supra note 21.
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the destructive action is not coercion or conquest in any
sense, but the striking of spectacular blows for propaganda
effects.
That the PFLP istself [sic] and the fedayeen generally
may have engaged elsewhere in "warlike operations" does
not affect our result. Battles between fedayeen forces and
Israelis, bombing of Israeli territory, and other forms of com-
parable violence, whether called "guerrilla" or "commando"
or whatever, were probably "warlike" in a pertinent sense.
But that scarcely extends the adjective to all bombings, kill-
ings, and destruction anywhere under PFLP auspices.8 3
Given this analysis, it would seem that the loss was beyond
the contemplation of the insurance industry when drafting the
clauses if their intent had been to exclude risks arising from a
state of war to which the insured could reasonably be foreseen
to be exposed. 84 However, the Pan Am court did recognize
the possibility that other activity by the PFLP, when conduct-
ed against forces or citizens involved in the Arab-Israeli con-
flict, would constitute "warlike operations"."5 Where citizens of
neutral nationality owned private property located where irregu-
lar forces were engaged in military conflict, the resulting damage
to such private property has been held to be the product of "war-
like operations" for purposes of insurance.88 Such a holding is
reasonable in view of the fact that cargo "casualty" and "war risk"
insurance premiums change frequently, depending upon the sta-
bility of the applicable military and political atmosphere at all
points enroute at the time any specific contract is issued. Busi-
nessmen negotiating such contracts would at least avoid a certain
degree of risk of war damage when shipping goods to areas of
the world where it is known that armed terrorist groups such as
the fedayeen operated and dangerous political tension exists.
87
I The issue of whether or not "warlike operations" includes
terrorists strikes by irregular forces against official government
agencies or nationals of countries with which the irregular force
83. Civil No. 71-1118, at 94-95 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1973) (footnote omit-
ted).
84. Rogers, supra note 30.
85. Civil No. 71-1118, at 95 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1973).
86. Hamdi & Ibrahim Mango Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 291 F.2d 437 (2d
Cir. 1961).
87. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., Civil
No. 71-1118, at i (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-2604, 2d
Cir., Oct. 8, 1973.
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is warring, where those strikes are beyond the area of normal
hostilities, ig judicially unresolved. Some relevant implications
appearing in the Pan Am decision suggest such a possibil-
ity. On the one hand, the court dismissed acts of terrorism by
the PFLP "at places far removed from the locale or subject mat-
ter of warfare" when those acts were against "citizens of non-
belligerent powers.""8  In so finding, the court did not foreclose
the possibility that "warlike operations" might include fedayeen
terrorism abroad, where the violence is directed against Israeli
nationals or official government agencies. Possibly the Arab ter-
rorists' murder of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Summer Olympics in
Munich, Germany,"' seizure of recently released Jews from Russia
and forced closure of their refugee pilgrimage relaxation camps
in Austria,"0 or seizure of El Al airliners might be considered
"warlike operations". Indeed the latter possibility seems to have
been given further credence by the court's statement that:
[I]t must be recalled, Diop and Gueye [PFLP terrorists]
were assigned originally to help with the frustrated El Al
hijacking. An El Al success would have been above all a
victory in the "war" against Israel. 91
The alternative contention, that such terrorist acts abroad
would not be within the term "warlike operation", would seem
to be supported in reason by the argument that the contracting
parties, especially with regard to passengers and their insurers,
would not have prospectively imagined such acts of terrorism so
distant from the location of a war as acts incident thereto.9 2  Any
attempt to extend the condition of war beyond the geographic
and political boundaries of the countries of the combatants in-
volved, and to extend outward to some arbitrary point conceived
as the foreseeable "zone of danger" of the war, would seem un-
manageable as a judicial standard. The court would have to de-
cide in each specific instance whether the average reasonable in-
sured and insurer would have contemplated such a "warlike oper-
88. Id., at 94.
89. U.S. DEP'T STATE, Pub. No. 8689, supra note 1.
90. Blackmail in Vienna, 102 TImE, Oct. 8, 1973, at 50.
91. 'Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., Civil
No. 71-1118, at 89 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-2604,
2d Cir., Oct. 8, 1973. El Al is an airline owned and operated by the government
of Israel.
92. Id., at iii. Prior to the Pan Am hijacking herein involved, of the
numerous previous Arab terrorist hijackings, only one had been of a non-El Al
aircraft, and that was a T,W.A. flight enropti to Tel Aviv, Israel,
Vol. 4
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ation", taking into consideration the normal public policy rules
which interpret ambiguities in favor of the insured to enforce the
protection he purchased.
In determining if individual acts of terrorism by irregular
forces constitute "warlike operations", consideration of anoth-
er factor from the Pan Am decision appears to be of some
value. The intent of the guerrilla force, where it can be deter-
mined, may provide a clue as to whether the act of terrorism
is tied to some condition of war. Judge Frankel infers that where
it can be determined that harassment or conquest of some recog-
nized enemy is the motive for the attack, it would seem more
probable that loss was the result of a "warlike operation" than
if the avowed purpose of the attack was mere spectacularism for
propaganda purposes. 93  Determining such intent would seem ex-
tremely difficult absent the substantive statement of intent by the
PFLP in the Pan Am case. Considering the fact that pro-
fessed guerrilla tactics rotate about a combination of indecisive
military engagements, including limited attacks at the enemy's
flank and rear, terrorist strikes against all interests favorable to
the guerrilla's enemy, and intensive propaganda campaigns to
gain support of indigenous population,9 4 it becomes readily appar-
ent that such a finding of intent, even if useful, would usually
be impossible. 95
B. Civil War, Insurrection, Rebellion or Revolution96
The "war risks" specified by the terms describing a civil rev-
olution are closely allied to risks contemplated in the terms "war-
like operations" or "hostilities". The major technical distinction
is that while "warlike operations" require belligerent parties of
different nationalities sustaining combat across international
boundaries, a civil revolution contemplates war only within one
recognized nation. 97  From the time of the Civil War, American
93. Id., at 94. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
94. MAO TSE-TUNG, supra note 3.
95. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., Civil
No. 71-1118, at vii (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-2604, 2d
Cir., Oct. 8, 1973. Court implied doubt as to the usual usefulness of analyzing
intent of the terrorist as Chief Judge Magruder suggested in Home Ins. Co.
v. Davila, 212 F.2d 731, 737 (1st Cir. 1954).
96. Hereinafter in the text all these terms shall be considered synonymously
in the term "civil revolution". Comparative distinctions as needed appear below.
See Home Ins. Co. v. Davila, 212 F.2d 731 (1st Cir. 1954).




Galyean: Acts of Terrorism and Combat by Irregular Forces--An Insurance "W
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1974
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JouRNAL
courts have recognized such a concept of war where multiple gov-
ernmental factions-either de jure or de Iacto-existing within
a single country, claim sovereign rights against each other.98 The
United States Supreme Court in The Prize Cases99 enunciated
some objective standards based on a sovereignty concept as a test
for civil war:
A civil war. . . becomes such by its incidents . . . the num-
ber, power, and organization of the persons who originate
and carry it on. When the party in rebellion occupy and
hold [sic] in a hostile manner a certain portion of territory;
have declared their independence; have cast off their alle-
giance; have organized armies; have commenced hostilities
against their former sovereign, the world acknowledges them
as belligerents and the contest a war.100
Modern federal case authority indicates that destruction of
property by irregular forces, indigenous to the country whose duly
constituted sovereign they are actively attempting to overthrow,
is the result of insurrection or rebellion for insurance purposes.'
In Home Insurance Co. v. Davila,'0° Chief Judge Magruder pre-
sented an extensive analysis of insurrection and rebellion. The
court denied recovery to an insured, under a policy excluding
civil insurrection and revolution risks, for the loss of three build-
ings burned as a result of terrorist activity by a small "extremist"
group calling themselves the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico. In
holding that the loss was excludable from indemnification by the
insurer as the result of civil insurrection or rebellion, Chief Judge
Magruder described revolutions in terms of an evolutionary proc-
ess. Originating with a small insurrection by a weak rebel force
resolved to overthrow the government but lacking the capability
to do so, a conflict can develop into a rebellion as it gains force
98. Id. See also Dole v. Merchants' Mut. Marine Ins. Co., 51 Me. 465
(1863).
99. The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635
(1862).
100. Id., at 666-67.
101. See Home Ins. Co. v. Davila, 212 F.2d 731 (1st Cir. 1954) (buildings
in Puerto Rico burned by terrorist group); International Dairy Engineering Co.
v. American Home Assur. Co., 253 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Cal. 1970), ajj'd, 474
F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1973) (cargo and property of neutral company destroyed
in U.S. action against Viet Cong); Indemnity Ins. Co. v. du Pont, 292 F.2d
569 (5th Cir. 1961) (aircraft enroute from Miami, Fla., to Birmingham, Ala.,
hijacked to Cuba, fired on by government troops and forced to ditch off Guan-
tanamo Bay).
102. 212 F.2d 731 (1st Cir. 1954).
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and magnitude. It becomes a revolution when it has accom-
plished its purpose and the sovereign government is overthrown.
Furthermore, the court indicated that losses from terrorist strikes
at all stages of the revolutionary movement, intended by the per-
petrators to contribute thereto, regardless of whether the strikes
were aimed at sovereign or private interests, were excludable
from insurance coverage as the result of "civil insurrection, rebel-
lion, civil war, or revolution".103
In applying the Davila standard, the Pan Am court deter-
mined that neither the requisite intent that the hijacking be
aimed at assisting in some way the overthrow of the Jordanian
government nor the requisite existence of any such active rebel-
lious movement to accomplish such revolution was present."0
However, the Davila standard seems to leave no doubt that de-
struction resulting from terrorist violence by guerrilla forces en-
gaged in an active insurrection, intended to further the revolu-
103. In Davila, Chief Judge Magruder wrote:
To constitute an insurrection or rebellion within the meaning of these
policies, there must have been a movement accompanied by action spe-
cifically intended to overthrow the constituted government . . . an in-
surrection aimed to accomplish the overthrow of the constituted govern-
ment is no less an insurrection because the chances of success are for-
lorn . . . . At the time of its breaking out, an insurrection may not
necessarily look impressive either in numbers, equipment, or organiza-
tion. As the insurrection develops into an affair of greater magnitude
the insurrection . . . may be spoken of as a "rebellion." If the insur-
rection or rebellion proceeds to attainment of its objective, . . . then
the movement, retroactively, will be dignified by the characterization
of a "revolution." . . . The first forcible action of the insurgents need
not necessarily be directed against military establishments of the regu-
larly constituted government. It may start as a sudden surprise attack
upon the civil authorities of a community with incidental destruction
of property by fire or pillage, even before the military forces of the
constituted government have been alerted and mobilized into action to
suppress the insurrection. When an insured suffers a loss at such an
incipient state of the insurrection, it must be deemed a loss by fire
caused directly or indirectly by insurrection, within the meaning of the
exclusionary language of the policies, even though the insurrection has
not yet proceeded to a stage where rebel armed forces, . . . are actually
engaged in military operations against an army of the constituted gov-
ernment . . . . Whether it was an "insurrection" or not depended upon
what was in their minds as the objective or objectives of the uprising.
Id., at 736-37. Lacking specific intent to overthrow the sovereign government,
civil riots (such as the 1966 Watts riots, or possibly the Wounded Knee seizure
incident of 1973) seem to fall outside the scope of "war risks". For a discussion
of "Riot Insurance" beyond the scope of this comment see Note, 77 YALE L.J.
541 (1968). Considering the application of Davila to destruction by SDS and
Weathermen bonds, the Pan Am court expressed doubt that such incidents
would constitute insurrections. Civil No. 71-1118, at vii, viii (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
24, 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-2604, 2d Cir., Oct. 8, 1973.
104. Civil No. 71-1118, at 73-82 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1973), appeal doc-
keted No. 73-2604, 2d Cir., Oct. 8, 1973.
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tionary movement, would fall within the "war risk" definitions
of civil revolution. Certainly each case requires extensive factual
analysis, but adjudication of the issue of applicability of such
standards to losses sustained in underdeveloped countries where
guerrilla warfare and internal political upheaval are prevalent'0 5
is a frequently recurrent possibility. The standard is helpful as
a guide to possible solution of whether certain insurance benefits
would be denied to parties of neutral nationalities while abroad
where an insurrection develops from which they sustain loss.
Such cases might include: an American's auto overturned and
damaged in Athens in a student revolt against the government
of Greece; 106 the execution of an American student by a new
military government in Santiago during a revolution in Chile;
0 7
terrorist blackmail kidnap, ransom, and murder of American busi-
ness executives in South America;108 destruction of a Y.M.C.A.
facility in Central America in a revolt against a local government
and the United States troops located therein.' 09
V. RECOMMENDED MINIMUM CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFYING
TERRORISM AMONG WAR RISKS
After finding the existence of a condition of war concurrent
with injury caused by irregular forces, the court has the difficult
task of determining whether there is a sufficient nexus between
the war and the act inflicting the injury in order to qualify the
loss as the result of "war risks". The court should closely analyze
both the specific terrorist act and the irregular force involved be-
fore ruling that a link between the loss and a "war" exists.
Due to public policy considerations favoring recovery by the
insured for his loss in accordance with the purpose of the insur-
ance contract, the court should require the insurer to prove that
such a nexus exists. 10 This is consistent with the judicial tend-
ency to interpret ambiguities in insurance contracts in favor of
105. MAO TSE-TUNG, supra note 3, at 41.
106. San Diego Union, Nov. 18, 1973, § 1, at 1, col. 4.
107. Slaughterhouse in Santiago, 82 NEWSWEEK, October 8, 1973, at 53-54.
108. See Living in Fear-Executive Kidnapping, 81 NEWSWEEK, June 11,
1973, at 98-99; Argentina-A Way of Death, 102 TIME, December 3, 1973, at
56.
109. National Board of Y.M.C.A. v. United States, 395 U.S. 85 (1969).
110. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., Civil
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the insured. If the insurer fails to sustain this burden of proof,
the court should determine the loss to be the result of normal
criminal conduct and among the risks assumed by the insurer."'
The modern emergence of large-scale terrorism as a tactic
used by irregular forces has basically occurred since the currently
popular "war risk" terms were drafted. 112  This has placed a new
burden upon the proponent of the proposition that a given terror-
ist act provides the required link between a given loss and a war
sufficient to justify attributing the loss to "war risks." In order
to establish the existence of the requisite nexus between a loss
and a "war" which conventional warfare normally provides, irreg-
ular force activity should satisfy at least five criteria. The act
of terrorism may fall within one of the enumerated "war risks"
if: the guerrilla force perpetrating the act is a para-military group
actively engaged as a dedicated belligerent in the war, 1 3 the
guerrilla force is of sufficient strength that its general aggressive
acts would warrant military resistance wherever possible by en-
emy sovereign military forces;"14 the terrorist act itself is within
the area normally expected to be circumscribed by the war in-
volved; 15 the act resulting directly in the loss was concurrently
intended by the perpetrators to be an accomplishment of some
military significance against its enemies;" 6 and finally, the equip-
ment used to inflict the loss and the damage itself is the type
which normally could be foreseen to result from an act of war."
7
111. Id. See also United States v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 178
F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1949), affd, 349 U.S. 54 (1950); Airlift Int'l, Inc. v. United
States, 335 F. Supp. 442 (1971), a~fd per curiam, 460 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir.
1972).
112. Compare U.S. DEP'T STATE, Pub. No. 8689, supra note 1, with discus-
sion of drafting modem "war risk" clauses in text accompanying notes 44-47
supra.
113. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., Civil
No. 71-1118 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-2604, 2d Cir.,
Oct. 8, 1973; Home Ins. Co. v. Davilla, 212 F.2d 731 (1st Cir. 1954).
114. Id. See also Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261 (1901); Flota
Mercante Dominicana v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 272 F. Supp. 540
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
115. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., Civil
No. 71-1118 at 94-95 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-2604,
2d Cir., Oct. 8, 1973 (see quote on this point in the text accompanying note
83 supra.
116. Id. See Home Ins. Co. v. Davila, 212 F.2d 731 at 736-37 (1st Cir.
1954) and Note 103 supra. See also discussion of this point in text accompany-
ing notes 93-95 supra.
117. Flota Mercante Dominicana v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 272 F.
Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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Recent technological developments have substantially in-
creased the mobility and potency of irregular forces, giving rise
to the possibility of immediate global escalation of an originally
local conflict. The resulting effects on modem warfare precipi-
tated by such technological advancements seem to have been be-
yond the contemplation of the parties to insurance contracts when
the contemporary "war risk" clauses were drafted immediately
after the Korean conflict." 8  Unless all five standards are met,
terrorist activity does not appear to satisfy all basic elements of
"war risks". Therefore, in order to fulfill the intent of the parties
to insurance contracts containing a "war risks" clause, all five cri-
teria should be met before a loss caused by combat or terrorism
by irregular forces is adjudicated to be the result of war risks.
VI. CONCLUSION
The emergence of international terrorism as a tactic of mod-
em warfare, as illustrated by the increasing frequency of violent
attacks by guerrillas against enemy and neutral governmental and
private interests, 119 should be recognized by courts in determining
which "war risks" are excluded in insurance policies. Unless the
language of the policy specifically defines "war" to the contrary, the
court should attempt to ascertain the probable intent of the par-
ties to the insurance contract by application of a broad interpre-
tation of the concept of a state of war, especially where the insur-
ance contract seems to cover the whole field of "war risks". 20
Such an interpretation should be based on the common sense ap-
proach of "war in fact" between opposing forces of significant
strength to warrant recognition that the conflict poses a serious
threat to the political stability of one or more of the sovereign
belligerents. Military response by a sovereign employing de-
structive equipment adapted for modern warfare should be con-
sidered by courts as prima facie evidence of that sovereign's im-
plied declaration of a state of war within the common sense
meaning of the term.'' Having found such a condition to exist,
courts should recognize as contemplated by the contracting par-
118. See authorities cited in note 112 supra.
119. U.S. DEP'T STATE, Pub. No. 8680, supra note 1.
120. Wheeler, supra note 45; see also discussion of this point in text ac-
companying notes 45-50 supra.
121. Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261 (1901); Flota Mercante Do-
minicana v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 272 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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ties the complete spectrum of battle techniques common to mod-
em warfare, from acts of terrorism by small guerrilla units to
battlefront confrontations of huge armies.
Where a certain litigated loss is the direct result of terror-
ism by a small irregular force, the court should scrutinize care-
fully both the act and the force involved to verify the actual link
of the act to the war. This nexus may be found and the act
of terrorism may fall within the enumerated "war risks" if all
of the minimum recommended criteria have been established.
1 22
However, where any one of these factors is lacking, the court
should grant the insured indemnity for his loss pursuant to the
insurance contract. Given such a case, the loss should not be
considered the result of a "war risk". Without a change of lan-
guage in future insurance policies specifically excluding loss re-
sulting from certain or all acts of terrorism, such acts should be
considered normal criminal risks assumed by the insurance com-
pany.
Thomas E. Galyean
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